NOTES
MALPRACTICE IMMUNITY:
AN ILLEGITIMATE AND
INEFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO THE
INDIGENT-DEFENSE CRISIS
HAROLD H. CHEN
"Not even a lawyer with an S on his chest could effectively handle this docket."'
INTRODUCTION

In 1963, the Supreme Court held in Gideon v. Wainwright that
the Sixth Amendment requires states to appoint counsel for all
indigent defendants charged with felonies in state court.2 Praising
the Court's judicial activism, commentators and advocates for the
poor hailed its ruling as long overdue. 3 Three decades later, however, political and economic realities threaten the effective implementation of Gideon's guarantee. As the nation has intensified its
zealous efforts to fight the "war" on crime and illegal drugs, the
burdens on our criminal justice system have increased exponential-

ly.' Yet, while state legislatures have committed public resources
to constructing more prisons and putting more police officers on
the street, they largely have neglected to increase funding for
indigent-defense programs.5 Thus, it is no surprise that a committee of the American Bar Association recently determined that
most indigent-defense programs are ina state of crisis.6

1. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789 (La. 1993) (quoting and affirming the trial
judge's ruling that a public defender's excessive caseload and inadequate funding violated

the constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. See, eg., ANTHONY LEwIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET (1964); Gerald F. Uelmen, 2001:
A Train Ride: A Guided Tour of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, LAw &

CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1995, at 1, 22-23.
4. Richard Klein & Robert Spangenberg, The Indigent Defense Crisis, 1993 A.B.A.
SEC. OF CRIM. JUST. 1, 1.
5. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
6. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 4, at 25.
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It is against this troubled backdrop that several state courts
have decided to depart from the traditional rule proscribing the
grant of malpractice immunity to public defenders and court-appointed counsel.7 Primarily within the last decade, courts in six
states8 have chosen to shield indigent-defense attorneys9 from
malpractice suits brought by their indigent clients. This liability
protection has come under the rubrics of qualified immunity and
absolute immunity. Under qualified immunity, indigent-defense
attorneys are considered state employees and thus are insulated
from malpractice liability for all discretionary acts and omissions
committed in the course of their official duties. ° Absolute immunity, in contrast, uses public policy considerations as a basis for
exempting indigent-defense attorneys from all tortious liability."
Squarely disagreeing with this dramatic shift in the law, this
Note argues that both forms of malpractice immunity simply transfer the burdens of our troubled criminal justice system onto the
backs of its weakest members-indigent criminal defendants. Although sympathetic of the hardships that indigent-defense attorneys face on a daily basis, this Note asserts that the doctrine of
malpractice immunity is fundamentally incompatible with our adversary system of criminal justice and our concept of professional
accountability in the attorney-client relationship. This Note further
argues that the grant of malpractice immunity has unacceptable
costs not only for indigent defendants but also for the legal profession and the general public. In consideration of these glaring flaws
and the recent appearance of immunity in this area of the law,
this Note concludes that malpractice immunity is essentially a
disingenuous judicial attempt to protect the public treasury at the
expense of the indigent criminal defendant.

7. This Note refers to the traditional view proscribing malpractice immunity as the

"no-immunity rule." See infra Section II(A).
8. The state courts that have granted malpractice immunity are Delaware, Minnesota, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, and Vermont. This Note refers to these courts as
the "immunity courts." With the exception of New York and New Mexico, courts of last

resort of each state participated in the decision to grant immunity. See infra Section
II(B).
9. Unless otherwise noted, the term "indigent-defense attorneys" includes both public defenders and court-appointed counsel. Of course, there are differences between these

two types of attorneys, see text accompanying note 32, that may affect issues such as indemnification from suit.
10. Qualified immunity is discussed in full infra Section II(B)(1).

11. Absolute immunity is discussed in full infra Section II(B)(2).
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Part I of this Note traces the historical development of the
right to counsel and describes the present crisis in indigent defense. Part II discusses the traditional no-immunity rule, examines
the recent emergence of qualified and absolute immunity, and
analyzes the reasoning that animates both forms of immunity. Part
III determines that malpractice immunity is inconsistent with our
adversary system of criminal justice and our standards of professional responsibility and accountability. In light of this critique, this
Part concludes that immunity is nothing more than a judicial effort
to insulate the state from having to pay damages to indigent clients who successfully sue their defense counsel for malpractice.
Finally, after considering several proposals for reform, Part IV
argues that the no-immunity rule actually may provide a means of
addressing the underlying cause of the indigent-defense crisis.
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL: PAST AND PRESENT

The Sixth Amendment commands that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assis-

tance of Counsel for his defence."' Although most Americans
tacitly accept the right to counsel as an integral part of our criminal justice system, it has taken more than 170 years for these
words to assume their modem doctrinal meaning.
A. The Evolution of the Sixth Amendment
The right to counsel is rooted in the early history of the republic. In 1791, twelve of the thirteen original states had fully
recognized the right to counsel in criminal prosecutions.' 3 This
colonial practice of allowing criminal defendants to obtain counsel
marked a radical departure from traditional English criminal law.
Under English law, a defendant charged with a felony could retain
counsel only to discuss matters of pleading and specific questions
of law at trial; an attorney could not argue questions of fact on a
defendant's behalf.'4 Somewhat paradoxically, a defendant
charged with a misdemeanor, such as libel or battery, was granted
the full right to counsel. 5
12.
13.
14.
(1984).
15.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 64-65 (1932).
2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE § 11.1, at

3

See Alexander Holtzoff, The Right of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 20
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In stark contrast, most American colonies flatly rejected the
idea of restricting the defense attorney's role in criminal prosecutions. In fact, the constitutions of Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
and Delaware required that counsel be appointed for defendants
accused of a capital crime; Connecticut's constitution even required
that courts appoint counsel for all indigent defendants.16 And
while several other colonies had not specifically enumerated the
right to counsel in their constitutions at this point, there was "a
greater awareness in American courts that [a defendant without an
attorney] was at a serious disadvantage ... [an] awareness [that]

became keener as the number of lawyers increased in colonial
America."' 7
Despite this appreciation of the need for legal representation
in criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the
right to counsel lay dormant for more than 140 years. Beginning in
1932, the Court signaled its intention to give substance to the
spare text of the Sixth Amendment. In Powell v. Alabama, the
Court acknowledged for the first time that the failure to appoint
counsel for an indigent defendant could compromise his due process rights. 8 The Powell defendants were several black men
charged with the alleged rape of two white girls. In three trials

N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 4 (1944) (citing 1 JAMES F. ARCHBOLD, PRACTICE, PLEADING AND
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 584 (New York, Banks & Brothers, 7th ed. 1860)); see

also 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 14, § 11.1, at 3. This common law rule remained a
part of English criminal law until Parliament passed a statute in 1836 allowing counsel to

present a full defense at felony trials. LEONARD W. LEvy, ORIGINS OF THE FIFr
AMENDMENT 322 (2d ed. 1986); see also Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 466 (1942), over-

ruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The rationale behind this English
rule was steeped in deference to the Crown and in the perception that felony defendants
posed a greater danger to the ruling order. Office of Legal Policy, Department of Justice,
The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Under the Massiah Line of Cases, 22 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 661, 672 (1989). Agreeing with this logic, Lord Coke argued that the presence
of counsel was unnecessary because the Crown would charge a person with a felony only
when the evidence against him was "so clear and manifest ... [that] there [could] be no

defence." David Fellman, The Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal Courts, 30 NEB.
L. REv. 559, 560 (1951) (citing SIR EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENG-

LAND, THIRD PART 29 (London, E. & R. Brooke 1797)). Similarly, Sir James Stephen
contended that the British government could not afford to be generous with suspected

criminals because it lacked a standing army and an organized police force. Id. at 560-61
(citing 1 SIR JAMES STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 354-75

(1883)).
16. WLAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 18-26
(1955).

17. Id. at 25.
18.

287 U.S. 45, 66-68 (1932).
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completed in a single day, the jury found the defendants guilty
and sentenced them to death; counsel was not provided at any of
these trials.' 9 Recognizing the injustice of these circumstances, the
Court found that "the necessity of counsel was so vital and imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."' The Powell holding later was extended to require that indigent defendants have
appointed counsel in all federal criminal proceedings.2 Yet, because most criminal cases were-and continue to be prosecuted at
the state level, these rulings provided little assistance to most
indigent defendants.'
In Gideon v. Wainwright, the Warren Court ushered in a new
and sweeping interpretation of the right to counsel.' In Gideon,
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment entitled an indigent
defendant to appointed counsel in all felony cases-whether state
or federal.24 Finding that state and federal governments "properly
spend vast sums of money to establish machinery to try defendants
accused of crime" and that attorneys are "essential to protect the
public's interest in an orderly society," the Court concluded that
there could be no justice if a defendant had to "face his accusers
without a lawyer."' As Justice Black stated, it would be inconsistent with our vision of justice to do otherwise: "The right of one
charged with crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental
and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours."'
To the accused, a defense lawyer is a necessity, not a luxury.'
Subsequent rulings have continued to broaden the scope of
the Sixth Amendment and have entrenched the right to counsel as
an essential part of our constitutional jurisprudence on criminal
law. In Miranda v. Arizona, the Warren Court held that police
must inform a suspect during pre-charge interrogations that an

19. Id. at 49-50.
20. Id.at 71.
21. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
22. See Suzanne E. Mounts, Public Defender Programs, Professional Responsibility,
and Competent Representation, 1982 Wis. L. Rn-v. 473, 476.

23. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. Id. at 342-45.
25. Id. at 344.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
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attorney will be appointed for him if he cannot afford one.' This
responsibility to inform suspects about their Sixth Amendment
rights later was applied to all post-charge situations in which witnesses confront the defendant. z9 Gideon's reach eventually was
held to include defendants charged with misdemeanors when the
Court ruled in Argersinger v. Hamlin that an attorney must be
appointed in all cases in which incarceration could result."
B. The Current Crisis in Indigent Defense
When the Court decided cases such as Gideon and Argersinger, it did not prescribe a rigid system for providing legal services
to indigent defendants. Rather, it gave the states substantial discretion to decide for themselves how to comply with Gideon's mandate that all defendants be provided with adequate legal representation. States have generally utilized a combination of three basic
systems-public defender, assigned counsel, and a contract-based
model-to fulfill their Sixth Amendment obligations.3 Most
states, especially those with sizable urban areas, use a combination
of public defenders and court-appointed counsel to provide indigent representation.32

28. 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966).
29. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
30. 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972). Several other decisions have also interpreted the Sixth
Amendment broadly. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967) (extending due process
protection to juveniles in delinquency proceedings leading to possible incarceration); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357-58 (1963) (holding that the Equal Protection Clause
entitles the defendant to an attorney on first appeal).
31. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 4, at 3 (citing THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES 5 (1992)).
32. A recent survey determined that public defender offices serve as the primary
method of delivering criminal defense services to approximately 65% of the indigent
population. Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 4, at 7 (citing STANDING COMMITTEE ON
LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AN INTRODUCTION TO DEFENSE SYSTEMS 15 (1986)). Most public defender offices are public or private
nonprofit organizations staffed with full or part-time attorneys. Many states also use an
assigned counsel system in which cases are distributed to private attorneys who are compensated on a case-by-case basis. A Department of Justice survey found that the greatest
number of counties use some form of the assigned counsel system. The third form of
counsel provision is a contract-based system. Under this model, a group of attorneys
agrees to provide representation to indigent clients in a jurisdiction for a specific period;
in return, they receive compensation from the state or county. The Department of Justice
survey found that 1,144 counties employ a public defender system, 1,609 counties employ
the assigned counsel system, and 330 counties employ the contract system. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL DEFENSE FOR THE POOR 3 (1988).
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Although the Court was able to require the appointment of
counsel with a stroke of a pen, it has proven far more difficult to
enforce Gideon's mandate in practice. Indigent-defense providers
currently are experiencing a crisis that has severely compromised
the Sixth Amendment guarantee that adequate representation be
provided in all criminal proceedings. Three factors-criminal justice
policy, the economy, and the "war on drugs"-have combined to
strain the level and quality of indigent-defense representation.33
The root of the crisis is that increased efforts to fight crime have
clogged the courts and have swamped indigent-defense attorneys
with unmanageable caseloads. While state legislatures have willingly appropriated additional resources to fight crime, most have
neglected to increase funding to support the other components of
the criminal justice system: prosecution, the courts, and public
defense.' According to a 1990 Department of Justice study,
42.8% of national expenditures on the criminal justice system were
spent on police, 33.6% were spent on corrections, 12.5% on the
courts, and 7.4% on prosecution. In contrast, a mere 2.3% of
the total criminal justice expenditures were devoted to legal services for indigent defendants.36
Reports of overburdened and underfunded indigent-defense
programs are all too common. In late 1992, the state of New Jersey eliminated $3.05 million from the budget of the Department of
the Public Advocate; $2.9 million of that amount came out of the
public defender's budget.37 In Connecticut, the state Civil Liberties Union filed suit against the governor and the Public Defender
Services Commission, alleging that the state's inadequate funding
of the indigent-defense system violated the constitutional right to
counsel because public defenders had handled an average of 1,045
cases apiece during the previous year. One New Orleans public

33.

Klein & Spangenberg, supra note 4, at 3.

34. Id. at 5.
35.

BUREAU

OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

SOURCEBOOK

OF

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 3 (1992). Approximately $74 billion was spent overall in
administering the criminal justice system. Id. at 2.

36. Id. at 3.
37. Rocco Cammarere, Public Defender Funding Deadline Passes with No Solution,
NEW JERSEY LAW., Jan. 4, 1995, at 3. The person who had served as Public Advocate
had resigned several months earlier in "disgust" to protest these budget reductions. New
Jersey Shuts Down Its Advocate; Was Unique in Nation, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1992, at 3.
38. Lynne Tuohy, CCLU Suit Lays Bare a Public Defense System in Crisis, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 8, 1995, at Al.
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defender's caseload was so excessive that he sued himself, arguing
that his caseload made effective client representation an impossibility. Agreeing with the defender, the trial judge ruled that "[n]ot
even a lawyer with an S on his chest could effectively handle this
docket."39 The defender had represented 418 clients in seven
months; 70 cases were pending trial.'
Other anecdotal evidence further demonstrates that governmental spending on the criminal justice system has not kept pace
with the increase in arrests and prosecutions. A brief survey reveals that indigent-defense programs are among the first services
to be cut from state and local budgets during difficult economic
times. For example, the municipal government of Orange County,
California, eliminated $3.7 million from its indigent-defense services budget-a 29% reduction-in an attempt to bail out of its highly publicized bankruptcy.4 ' This budget cut forced a consolidation
of the county public defender's office and drastically reduced the
amount of funds available for retaining private defense attorneys. 42 In contrast, the next largest budget cut by percentage was
a 17.8% cut from the human resources department budget-a
reduction of only $800,000. 4' In Phoenix, after the county government rebuffed the defender's request for a funding increase, the
local newspaper ran a byline that encapsulates the public's attitude
toward funding indigent-defense programs: "Defender's Office Told
to Stand in Line."' Finally, the Governor of New York called
recently for a cut of $13.8 million in state funding for legal aid
societies and public defenders-a 35% reduction; the Governor left
intact a $20.8 million aid program for local prosecutors and proposed a four-year $476 million prison expansion program.45 It is
clear, therefore, that an increasingly cost-conscious public is unwill-

39.

State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 789 (La. 1993).

40. Id. at 784 (citing trial court record).
41. Dan Weikel & Julie Marquis, Programs for Poor Suffer Deepest Cuts, LA.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1994, at Al, A9.
42. Rene Lynch, Public Defenders Take on Bigger Caseload, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 9,
1995, at B1, B7. The county retained private defense attorneys when a conflict preempted

the public defender office from providing representation. Id. at B7.
43. Weikel & Marquis, supra note 41, at A9.
44. Chris Fiscus, Defender's Office Told to Stand in Line, PHOENIX GAz~rrE, Dec.

8, 1994, at B1.
45.

Gary Spencer, Pataki Backs Courts Budget of $1 Billion; Surcharge on Awards

Sought to Fund Increase, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 18, 1995, at 1.
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ing to provide desperately needed funds to support indigent-defense programs.

II. THE DOCTRINE OF MALPRACrICE IMMUNITY AS APPLIED TO
PUBLIC DEFENDERS AND COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL

The first case addressing malpractice immunity for public
defenders or court-appointed counsel did not occur until 1975.'
Since that time, the majority of state courts considering this issue
have determined that indigent-defense counsel are ineligible to
receive immunity from malpractice because they serve the same
function and purpose in the criminal justice system as privately
retained attorneys; both types of lawyers are legally and ethically
obligated to provide a competent defense for their clients. The
Supreme Court's rulings on civil rights actions brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 also support this view.47 In recent years, however,
several state courts have broken from the traditional no-immunity
rule and demonstrated a willingness to grant either qualified or
absolute immunity.
A. The Traditional No-Immunity Rule in Theory and in Practice
The dominant rule among state courts has been that public
defenders and court-appointed counsel should be denied malpractice immunity and should be held to the same professional standards as private attorneys. The first courts to consider this issue,
the Supreme Courts of Connecticut and of Pennsylvania, declined
to grant malpractice immunity in Spring v. Constantino and
4 9 respectively. Neither court could identify a
Reese v. Danforth,
principled legal basis for differentiating between the representation
provided by a public defender and that provided by a private
attorney. Basing their reasoning on these seminal cases, courts in

46. Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975).
47. See cases cited infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
48. 362 A.2d 871 (Conn. 1975). The plaintiff in Spring was a criminal defendant who
sued her attorney for negligence; the attorney was a public defender who had been appointed to defend her at trial. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that her attorney
had failed to advise her of bail procedures that could have secured her release from
prison. Id. at 873.
49. 406 A.2d 735 (Pa. 1979). In Reese, the plaintiff brought an action in trespass
alleging negligent representation against her former attorney, a county public defender.
The plaintiff had been confined involuntarily in a psychiatric hospital in a proceeding
brought pursuant to the state mental health and mental retardation statute. Id. at 736-37.
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four other states-Michigan, ° Florida," Indiana,52 and New Jersey53 -have explicitly adopted some form of the no-immunity
rule.4
In refusing to extend immunity to public defenders and courtappointed counsel, the no-immunity courts have consistently posited that these attorneys have the same function and purpose in the
criminal justice system as private attorneys. Although cognizant
that an indigent-defense attorney serves the public interest in representing poor defendants, these courts have ruled that his "role
does not differ from that of privately retained counsel."'55 Indigent-defense attorneys assume the same "duties as an officer of
the court and to an individual client" as private attorneys: They
are ethically and professionally obligated to conduct a "principled
and fearless" defense that is not deterred by the prospect of liability.5 6 Acting as "an adversary [of the state]" when defending his
client,57 the defender must fulfill the "overriding duty of zealous
representation of a client's interest"58 and serve as "an advocate
who once appointed owes a duty only to his client, the indigent
defendant." 9 In sum, the defender assumes "all the obligations
and protections attendant upon a private attorney-client relationship except one: the public pays his fee." 6 It is only appropriate
50. See Donigan v. Finn, 290 N.W.2d 80, 81 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (finding that
court-appointed counsel are not immune from malpractice liability when defending an
indigent client).
51. See Windsor v. Gibson, 424 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that the doctrine of judicial immunity does not preclude an action against the office of
the public defender by a former client).
52. See White v. Galvin, 524 N.E.2d 802, 804 (Ind. CL App. 1988) (holding that a
public defender is not a public employee as defined in the state tort claims act).
53. See Delbridge v. Office of Public Defender, 569 A.2d 854, 865 (NJ. Super. CL
Law Div. 1989) (finding that public defenders are not immune from a claim of legal malpractice). Delbridge is a somewhat atypical no-immunity case because it also held that the
public defender should be considered an "employee" under the state tort claims act for
indemnification purposes. Id. at 869-71. None of the other no-immunity cases classify the
indigent-defense attorney under this rubric.
54. This section will focus primarily on the arguments made in Spring and Reese
because the other no-immunity courts have based their reasoning on these seminal cases.
55. Windsor v. Gibson, 424 So. 2d 888, 889 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1982).
56. Spring v. Constantino, 362 A.2d 871, 875 (Conn. 1975); see also Delbridge, 569
A.2d at 866.
57. Spring, 362 A.2d at 875 (citing State v. Jackson, 294 A.2d 517 (Conn. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 870 (1972)).
58. Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 738 (Pa. 1979).
59. Windsor, 424 So. 2d at 889.
60. Reese, 406 A.2d at 739.
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that the indigent-defense attorney be held liable for tortious conduct committed in the scope of his professional duties. 61

Accepting the doctrinal starting point that public defenders
and court-appointed counsel must function as privately retained

attorneys in our adversary system, the no-immunity rule also rejects the use of state tort immunity statutes as a means of shield-

ing indigent-defense attorneys from liability.62 Tort immunity statutes generally prevent private individuals from suing public officials in their individual capacities provided that their actions are

neither wanton nor willful.63 As one court stated, "Control, or the
right to control, is a precondition necessary to establish vicarious
liability in tort."' Yet, because the no-immunity position assumes
that the indigent-defense attorney opposes the state's interest when

representing a criminal defendant, state control does not exist.
The Connecticut Supreme Court's ruling in Spring illustrates
the no-immunity rule's refusal to apply tort immunity statutes in
order to insulate public defenders from tort liability. The tort
immunity statute in Spring immunized any "state officer or em-

ployee" from personal liability for actions taken within the scope
of his employment as long as the actions were neither wanton nor

willful.' The defendant, a public defender, argued that his acts
61. Delbridge v, Office of Public Defender, 569 A.2d 854, 866 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1989); see also Reese, 406 A.2d at 740 (finding that denying an indigent the tort
relief that is available to the paying client would distinguish between groups of plaintiffs
based on economic status).
62. The Spring court also held that the public defense of a client could not be construed as a sovereign or governmental act. Spring, 362 A.2d at 875.
63. See Spring, 362 A.2d at 876-77. For an example of a state tort immunity statute,
see the statute considered in Vick v. Hailer, 512 A.2d 249, 252 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986),
affd in part, 522 A.2d 865 (Del. 1987), and Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990),
cert. denied, 499 U.S. 952 (1991), discussed infra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
Under the Delaware statute, an indigent-defense attorney claiming immunity must prove
that the act or omission complained of (1) arose out of and in connection with the performance of an official duty; or (2) was done in good faith and in the belief that the
public interest would best be served thereby; or (3) was done without gross or wanton
negligence. Vick, 512 A.2d at 252 (applying DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4001 (Supp.
1994)).
64. White v. Galvin, 524 N.E.2d 802, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).
65. The relevant part of this statute stated:
No state officer or employee shall be personally liable for damage or injury,
not wanton or wilful, caused in the performance of his duties and within the
scope of his employment. Any person having a complaint for such damage or
injury shall present it as a claim against the state . ...
Spring, 362 A.2d at 875 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-165 (West 1988)).
The statute defining state officers and employees stated:
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and omissions in the context of the attorney-client relationship
should qualify him as a "state employee" within the purview of
the tort immunity statute. 6 Rejecting this argument, the Spring
court held steadfast to the foundational assumption that a public
defender serves the same functional purpose as a private attorney.
Once the attorney-client relationship begins, the status of the public defender is "that of an independent contractor rather than of
an employee [of the state]";67 the defender acts on behalf of his
client "as if he had been employed and retained by the defendant
whom he represents. ' The state's relationship with the public
defender, moreover, does not alter the latter's responsibilities to
his client. As a different court observed, the state's sole connection
to the defender is in paying his fee; it is the court, not the state,
that appoints the defender.69 Thus, because the "independence of
the public defender and his freedom from entanglement with the
state is a key constitutional underpinning of... the public defender system,"7 granting immunity vis-h-vis a tort immunity statute
would distinguish unfairly between plaintiffs based on their economic status.
Federal decisions on civil rights claims brought by indigent
clients under 42 U.S.C. § 19837' against their public defenders
provide additional support for the no-immunity rule. In Polk County v. Dodson, the Supreme Court specifically held that a public
defender serving as counsel for an indigent defendant did not act
"under color of state law" for purposes of section 1983.72 This
holding reinforces the no-immunity idea that the law should treat
defenders like private attorneys, not like state employees. The
[E]very person elected or appointed to or employed in any office, position or

post in the state government, whatever his title, classification or function and
whether he serves with or without remuneration or compensation.

Id. at 876 (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-141 (West 1988)).
66. Id. at 877.
67. Id. at 878.
68.
69.

Id.
)White v. Galvin, 524 N.E.2d 802, 804 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988).

70. Spring, 362 A.2d at 878.
71. The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory of the District of Columbia, subjects or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person with the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress.
72. 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).
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Court also held in Ferri v. Ackerman that section 1983 does not
protect counsel appointed to represent indigent defendants in
federal court from state court malpractice suits.73 Once again mirroring the rationale of the no-immunity rule, the Court found that
the public defender's principal responsibility was to "serve the
undivided interests of his client" rather than the interests of "the
public at large."'74 In a phrase reminiscent of Spring and Reese,
the Ferri Court held that immunity was improper because an indispensable element of the public defender's responsibilities was the
"ability to act independently of the Government and to oppose it
in adversary litigation."'7
B. The Emergence of Qualified and Absolute Immunity
In recent years, several state courts have ,strayed from the noimmunity rule and have granted some form of malpractice immunity to indigent-defense counsel. In particular, two forms of immunity have appeared on the criminal justice horizon: qualified (or
discretionary) immunity and absolute immunity. Under qualified
immunity, a public defender or court-appointed attorney is immune from suit for all "discretionary" acts or omissions made in
the course of executing her official duties. Under absolute immunity, an attorney is completely immune for all acts and omissions
made in the course of executing her official duties.
1. Qualified Immunity. The first court to grant qualified
immunity, a New York Supreme Court in Scott v. City of Niagara
Falls, 6 disagreed sharply with the analyses of Spring and Reese.

The Scott court found that the unique nature of the public
defender's duties gave rise to several policy reasons that justified,
if not required, the abandonment of the no-immunity rule. The
Scott court argued that a public defender, unlike a privately
retained attorney, was often "assigned an overwhelming number of
cases" and thus was forced to "effectively allocate [her] limited
time and resources to those matters which in [her] judgment have
a realistic chance for success."' In turn, the constant prospect of

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

444 U.S. 193 (1979).
Id. at 204.
Id.
407 N.Y.S.2d 103 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
Id. at 105.

796

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:783

potential liability arising out of every frivolous malpractice claim
would impair the public defender office's recruitment of capable
attorneys' In light of these concerns, the Scott court reasoned
that a grant of malpractice immunity was consistent with the public defender's duty to provide competent and zealous representation, especially because the courts or bar associations could
remove the public defender if she "fail[ed] to perform [her] duties
in a responsible fashion."79
Courts in three other states-Nevada, Delaware, and Vermont-have granted qualified immunity since Scott. In two terse
opinions, the Nevada Supreme Court granted qualified immunity
to public defenders and court-appointed counsel pursuant to the
Nevada tort immunity statute for state employees.8 Like Scott,
both Nevada cases implicitly rejected the arguments that undergird
the no-immunity rule in Spring and Reese. In Ramirez v. Harris,'
the Nevada Supreme Court ruled that because public defenders fit
the statutory definition of a "public officer,"' they could not be
sued for "malpractice arising out of discretionary decisions that
[were] made pursuant to their duties as public defenders."'
While this holding does not explicitly foreclose an indigent client
in Nevada from suing a public defender for intentional or reckless

78. Id.
79. Id.

80. In Briggs v. Lawrence, a California court of appeal adopted a rule that incorporates aspects of both qualified immunity and the no-immunity rule. 281 Cal. Rptr. 578
(Cal. Ct. App. 1991). In Briggs, the court held that a salaried full-time public defender is

a "public employee acting in the scope of his or her employment within the meaning of
the California Tort Claims Act." Id. at 586. The court also held, however, that the public
defender would not be immune from liability for malpractice. Id. Rather, the only "practical issue" addressed by the Briggs case was "whether the defendants may look to the

public entity for defense and for indemnification." Id.
81. See Morgano v. Smith, 879 P.2d 735, 737 (Nev. 1994); Ramirez v. Harris, 773
P.2d 343, 344 (Nev. 1989). Under Nevada's tort immunity statute, no action may be

brought against an officer of the state which is
[b]ased upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform

a discretionary function or duty on the part of the state or any of its agencies
or political subdivisions or of any officer, employee or immune contractor of
any of these, whether or not the discretion involved is abused.
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.032(2) (Michie Supp. 1993). This statute was cited in both
Nevada cases. See Morgano, 879 P.2d at 736-37; Ramirez, 773 P.2d at 344.
82. 773 P.2d at 343.
83. Section 41.0307(4)(b) of the Nevada Revised Statutes defines "public officer" to

include "[a] public defender and any deputy or assistant attorney of a public defender."
NEV.REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0307(4)(b) (Michie Supp. 1993).

84. Ramirez, 773 P.2d at 344-45.
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acts of malpractice, it does prevent her from suing for negligent
representation.85 The Nevada Supreme Court later used the same
rationale in Morgano v. Smith to extend the same degree of qualified immunity to court-appointed counsel.86
In Vick v. Hailer7 and Browne v. Robb,'s the Delaware
courts also held that public defenders and court-appointed counsel
should be considered state employees and thus enjoy qualified
immunity under the state tort claims statute. Like the Nevada
cases, the Vick court held in a brief opinion that the state tort
claims act immunized the public defender from malpractice liability. 9 The Browne court, however, considered the Delaware tort
claims statute at greater length. To claim immunity under this
statute, an indigent-defense attorney must prove that the act or
omission complained of (1) arose out of and in connection with
the performance of an official duty; (2) was done in good faith
and in the belief that the public interest would best be served
thereby; or (3) was done without gross or wanton negligence. 90
The Browne court found that this tort immunity statute was "intended to discourage lawsuits [that] might create a chilling effect
on the ability of public officials or employees to exercise their
discretionary authority."91 Observing that indigent-defense counsel
cannot refuse to take their clients' cases,' the Browne court held
that "a failure to recognize the statutory and common law principles of qualified immunity would necessarily 'chill' the private
contract system" used to provide indigent-defense services in Dela-

85. Id. at 345.
86. 879 P.2d 735, 737 (Nev. 1994) (finding that court-appointed counsel were immune
from malpractice for negligence arising out of their discretionary decisions). At the time,
the statute defining "public officer" and "officer" had been enlarged to include not only
public defenders but also "attomey[s] appointed to defend a person for a limited duration with limited jurisdiction." Id.
87. 512 A.2d 249, 252 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986), affd in part, 522 A.2d 865 (Del. 1987).
88. 583 A.2d 949 (Del. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 952 (1991).
89. Vick, 512 A.2d at 252. In affirming the Vick court's decision, the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that public defenders are indeed state employees within the
meaning of the state tort claims act. Browne, 583 A.2d at 951 (citing Vick v. Hailer, 522
A.2d 865 (Del. 1987) (unpublished opinion)).
90. Vick, 512 A.2d at 252 (applying DEL CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4001 (Supp. 1994)).
91. Browne, 583 A.2d at 952 (quoting Doe v. Cates, 499 A.2d 1175, 1181 (DeL Super. Ct. 1985)).
92. Browne, 583 A.2d at 952 (acknowledging that "contract lawyers do not have the
ability, which they ordinarily would possess in the marketplace, to reject such clients or
cases").
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ware.93 The Browne court therefore determined that the relationship between court-appointed attorneys and their indigent clients
necessitated that the former be entitled to qualified immunity as
state employees under the state tort immunity statute. 94
Following the lead of the Nevada and Delaware courts, the
Vermont Supreme Court held recently in Bradshaw v. Joseph that
a public defender is a state employee under state law and cannot
be sued for negligence while acting within the scope of his employment.' The Bradshaw court set forth a detailed rationale for
granting qualified immunity to public defenders-a rationale that
other state courts are likely to consult when considering a departure from the no-immunity rule in the future. In Bradshaw, a
disgruntled former client sued his public defender for negligence. 96 In response, the defender countered that he was considered a state employee and thus was within the ambit of the tort
immunity statute for state employees.' Under Vermont law, the
definition of a state employee "includes any elective or appointive
officer or employee within the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of state government or any former such employee or
officer."9 " While public defenders are not explicitly referred to as
state employees, the Bradshaw court nevertheless posited that the
language of the statute, particularly the use of the words "includes" and "without limitation," signified a legislative intent "to

93. Id. at 952.
94. Id. at 951-52. Although the Browne court did not explicitly refer to court-appointed counsel as state employees, its holding that these attorneys have qualified immunity under the state tort claims act has the effect of categorizing them under this rubric.

Id.
95.

Bradshaw v. Joseph, 666 A.2d 1175, 1176 (Vt. 1995).

96. Id. at 1175. The plaintiff in Bradshaw alleged that he had suffered damages as a
result of his public defender's negligence. The plaintiff had been charged with sexual assault; the court had set bail at $10,000. Yet, because the plaintiff could not meet this

requirement, he remained incarcerated. The public defender then successfully moved that
the plaintiff's bail be reduced to $5,000. The incarcerated plaintiff, however, alleged that

he had never been informed of this bail reduction-an amount that he could have met.
As a result of this alleged failure to fiotify, the plaintiff remained incarcerated until he
was eventually acquitted. Id. at 1776. The Bradshaw court did not mention how long the
plaintiff was imprisoned.

97. Id. at 1176. The tort immunity statute states that "when any act or omission of a
state employee, as defined in 3 V.S.A. § 1101, 'is believed to have caused damage to

property, injury to persons, or death, the exclusive right of action shall lie against the
state' and suit against the employee is prohibited." Id. (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
5602 (1995)).

98. Id. (emphasis omitted) (citing VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 1101(b) (1995)).
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enlarge the categories
of positions that fall within the definition of
'state employee."' 99 The Bradshaw court also posited that the origin and function of the public defender's office as well as its
source of funding suggested that a public defender should be considered a state employee: the legislature had created the offices of
the public defender and defender general; public defenders provided legal representation at state expense; and the state provided
compensation to both public defenders and the defender general."° The Bradshaw court concluded that the defender should be
considered a state employee and thus was entitled to qualified
immunity for 1"acts or omissions occurring within the scope of [his]
employment.''
2. Absolute Immunity. In the wake of qualified immunity, a
far more encompassing form of malpractice liability has
appeared-absolute immunity. Whereas qualified immunity protects
indigent-defense attorneys from malpractice for negligent acts or
omissions, the doctrine of absolute immunity protects attorneys
from liability for all job-related acts or omissions, including those
that result from recklessness, gross incompetence, or intentional
misconduct. And while the doctrine of qualified immunity rests
primarily on finding that an indigent-defense attorney qualifies as
a state employee under a tort immunity statute, the doctrine of
absolute immunity relies almost exclusively on public policy concerns.

Courts in two states, New Mexico and Minnesota, have granted absolute immunity to indigent-defense counsel. In Herrera v.
Sedillo,' ° the New Mexico Court of Appeals extended absolute
immunity to court-appointed attorneys pursuant to a state statute,
the Indigent Defense Act. The defendant in Herrera was an attorney appointed by the court and "retained under contract to the
Public Defender" in order to provide representation in a criminal

99. Id. According to the Bradshaw court, the statute's list of eight categories of state

employees, which included "state's attorneys," was not meant to be an exhaustive list. Id.
(stating that the "enumeration of positions is 'without limitation' ").
100. Id. at 1176-77.

101. Id. at 1177. The Bradshaw court also addressed several of the policy arguments
for and against malpractice immunity. These arguments will be considered in greater detail infra Section II(B)(2) and Part III.
102. 740 P.2d 1190 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987).
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case. °3 There was a dispute, however, whether this attorney was
appointed pursuant to the Indigent Defense Act or another state
statute, the Public Defender Act. Under the Indigent Defense Act,
a court-appointed attorney enjoyed absolute immunity: "No attorney assigned or contracted with to perform services under the
Indigent Defense Act... shall be held liable in any civil action
respecting his performance or nonperformance of such services.' " In contrast, the Public Defender Act neither provided for
nor denied immunity. 5 Without deciding under which statute
the defendant was acting, the Herrera court held that "the immunity granted to attorneys appointed under the Indigent Defense
Act" also applied to appointed counsel under contract to the public defender.'" The Herrera court could not discern a reason why
the legislature would have drawn a distinction between court-appointed attorneys and public defenders. °7
Clarifying the Herrera rationale, the New Mexico Court of
Appeals held in Coyazo v. State'" that both court-appointed
counsel and public defenders enjoy absolute immunity from malpractice. Whereas a court-appointed attorney is protected under
the state Indigent Defense Act, a public defender is protected as a
"public employee" under the state Tort Claims Act. More importantly, the Coyazo court provided several policy reasons as support
for its absolute-immunity stance. First, the court stated that absolute immunity encourages attorneys to participate as court-appointed counsel because they are "assured of not having to deal with
the threat of civil litigation atop a practice [that] consists of clients
they are not free to choose or refuse."'" Second, absolute immunity allows counsel to "exercise fully independent professional
judgment and discretion without fear of 'Monday morning
quarterbacking' in a civil context."' 10 Third, absolute immunity
allows private attorneys to lower insurance costs, which helps indigent defendants by encouraging more attorneys to participate as

103. Id. at 1191.
104. Id. (citing N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-16-10 (Michie Supp. 1984)).

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108.

897 P.2d 234, 238 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995).

109. Id. at 240.
110. Id.
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indigent-defense counsel.' Fourth, the Coyazo court candidly
stated that absolute immunity saves taxpayer money: "[I]mmunity
of necessity protects the public treasury.""' 2
Between the time of the Herrera and Coyazo decisions, the
Minnesota Supreme Court granted absolute immunity to public
defenders in Dziubak v. Mott." A controversial decision relying
solely on policy grounds, the Dziubak decision sparked intensive
analysis and harsh criticism from several commentators. 14 In ruling that public defenders should be completely immune from suit
for legal malpractice, the Dziubak court articulated a policy-based
rationale that conflicts with almost every aspect of the no-immunity rule. First, the Dziubak court held that significant differences
between public defenders and privately retained counsel warranted
different treatment under the law. As the Browne court also argued,"' the Dziubak court emphasized that a public defender
was unable to reject a client and was obligated to represent
whomever was assigned to her, regardless of caseload size or the
degree of difficulty presented by the case." 6 In contrast, a private attorney could choose to decline representing a client for a
variety of reasons, including the merits of the case, her current
caseload, or even the client's personality." 7 Citing a study finding
that Minnesota public defenders were "working substantially above
capacity with insufficient time to devote to their cases and their
clients," the court concluded that this inability to refuse clients was
a crucial difference justifying the extension of immunity to public
defenders."'

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
114. See Erika E. Pedersen, Note, You Only Get What You Can Pay For: Dziubak v.

Mott and Its Warning to the Indigent Defendant, 44 DEPAUL L. REv. 999, 1030-47
(1995); David J.Richards, Note, The Public Defender Defendant: A Model Statutory Approach to Public Defender Malpractice Liability, 29 VAL U. L. REV. 511, 538-47 (1994);
Jeffrey H. Rutherford, Comment, Dziubak v. Mott and the Need to Better Balance the

Interests of the Indigent Accused and Public Defenders, 78 MINN. L. REv. 977, 995-1005
(1994).
115.
116.
117.
118.
STUDY

See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 775.
Id.
Id. The study cited was THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, WEIGHTED CASELOAD
FOR THE STATE OF MINNESOTA BOARD OF PUBLIC DEFENSE 20 (1991).
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Second, the Dziubak court found another crucial distinction in
the gross disparity in funding between public defenders and privately retained counsel. While a private attorney was limited only
by the client's ability to pay, the court observed that public defender offices generally operate under fixed, insufficient budgets." 9 To support this finding, the court cited a study concluding that the increasing crime rate, the depressed economy, and an
insufficient budget had caused public defender caseloads to grow
dramatically.'" Reasoning that the public defender had little control over such factors, the court held that to subject her to malpractice suits for acts or omissions caused 2by circumstances beyond
her control would be "an unfair burden.' '
Third, the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted a utilitarian
policy analysis to justify the extension of malpractice immunity to
public defenders. It asserted that immunity would allow the public
defender to conserve her time, energy, and money in order to best
serve the indigent population." In addition, the Dziubak court
found that immunity would aid in the continued recruitment of
attorneys to serve as public defenders by minimizing the fear of
malpractice exposure." According to the court's reasoning, the
extension of immunity would ensure that indigent-defense resources would be used "for the defense of the accused, rather than
diminished through the defense of -public defenders against civil
suits for malpractice."' 24 Thus, the Dziubak court concluded that
the extension of immunity would conserve limited resources to
provide "an effective defense to the greatest number of indigent
defendants."'"
III. A CRITIQUE OF MALPRACTICE IMMUNITY
Despite its recent popularity among state courts, the doctrine
of malpractice immunity remains an illegitimate and ineffective response to the crisis in indigent defense. The courts that have broken from the no-immunity rule fail to recognize that malpractice

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

776. See also text accompanying note 118.
776-77.
777.
777-78.
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immunity has several glaring, if not indefensible, flaws. In an effort
to reveal these legal and policy-based weaknesses, this Part argues
that malpractice immunity undermines core principles of our criminal justice system, disregards the indigent defendant's rights, and
has tremendous costs not only for indigent defendants but also for
the legal profession and society as a whole. Finally, this Part exposes malpractice immunity for what it is: an attempt to protect
the public treasury at the indigent defendant's expense.
A. Malpractice Immunity Undermines Core Principles of Our
CriminalJustice System
1. The Adversary System. The first crucial defect with
malpractice immunity is its incompatibility with our adversary
system of criminal justice. The linchpin of our criminal justice
system is the idea that the state and the criminal defendant must
function as adversaries."6 Reflecting this basic premise, the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct state that "[the] lawyer
should act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."'
Applying this principle to criminal defendants who are unable to
hire their own lawyers, the Gideon Court found that there could
be no justice unless the accused has the services of an effective
and independent advocate." The no-immunity courts have kept
with Gideon's spirit and properly determined that an indigentdefense attorney must function purely as a private attorney
concerned with representing his client.'29 The indigent-defense
attorney, like his privately retained counterpart, bears the same
"overriding duty" to zealously represent his client's interests; the
only salient difference is that the public pays the lawyer's fee."
126. The Gideon Court itself acknowledged this fact: "[The] government hires lawyers

to prosecute and defendants who have the money hire lawyers to defend." Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
127. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.3 cmt. (1992); see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Preamble (1992) ("As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.").
128. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (finding that "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a

fair trial unless counsel is provided for him"); see also Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.
475, 489 (1978).
129. See Reese v. Danforth, 406 A.2d 735, 739 (Pa. 1979); see also supra Section
11(A) (discussing the no-immunity rule).

130. Reese, 406 A.2d at 738-39.
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This view finds additional support in the Supreme Court's civil
rights rulings under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which determined that
public defenders necessarily oppose the government as adversaries131 and do not act under color of state law in their official
capacities. 32
Requiring indigent-defense counsel to function as private attorneys also accords with the legal profession's sense of justice and
fairness. Few lawyers would question that an indigent defendant
should have the same rights and privileges that a paying client has
in the context of the attorney-client relationship. Like his nonindigent counterpart, an indigent defendant should have ultimate control in directing his defense and in choosing how to plead. 3
One therefore would expect an indigent client to have all of the
prerogatives subsumed in the right to counsel, including the right
to sue for malpractice.
The grant of malpractice immunity, however, destroys this
crucial assumption. By definition, malpractice immunity protects
indigent-defense attorneys from liability by taking from indigent
defendants a right that nonindigent defendants retain. In doing so,
the immunity courts concede that indigent defendants are entitled
only to a lawyer who is not legally and professionally accountable
to them." Under this view, a public defender or court-appointed
attorney is no longer the theoretical equivalent but an inferior
version of a private defense lawyer. Implicitly condoning a lesser
standard of criminal representation for indigent defendants, this
result is inconsistent with Gideon's charge that all criminal defendants should have the services of a zealous and effective advocate.
Courts inevitably weaken the vitality of the adversary system when
they take this position.
Furthermore, no set of policy reasons justifies departing from
the doctrinal starting point that an indigent-defense attorney functions as a private lawyer. The Scott, Browne, and Dziubak courts
argued that policy reasons, such as the defender's inability to refuse a case, the gross underfunding of indigent-defense programs,

131. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
133.

See, e.g., Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1322 (2d Cir.), cerL denied, 488 U.S.

890 (1988) (finding that the defendant, not his attorney, has the right to decide whether
to plead guilty, not guilty, or not guilty by reason of insanity).
134. The issue of professional accountability is further discussed infra Section
III(A)(2).
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and the fear of discouraging attorneys from taking indigent-defense
cases, justify an abandonment of the no-immunity rule. 35 Such
policy considerations, however, are an illegitimate basis for emasculating a person's Sixth Amendment rights: The costs to the individual and to society are simply too great. As one prominent
commentator noted, "An indigent-even one accused of committing heinous crimes-still has the right to the presumption of innocence and to a fair trial in which he can proffer a defense to the
charges leveled against him. ' ' 3 6 Lacking competent legal representation, "an innocent individual may be convicted of a crime
merely because she happens to be poor."'137 In turn, an improper
conviction inevitably leads to the imposition of unfair punishment,
including the death penalty.3 3 This result is simply unacceptable
in a society such as ours.
Another one of the glaring flaws of courts that grant qualified
immunity is their use of state tort immunity statutes as a basis for
granting immunity to indigent-defense counsel. Qualified-immunity
courts, such as the Nevada and Delaware courts, posit that a lawyer who serves as a public defender or as a court-appointed attorney should be considered a state employee or public official. 39
These courts are oblivious of the clear ethical contradiction here.
A defense attorney cannot serve simultaneously as both an advocate for a criminal defendant and for the state that wants to convict him. On the contrary, the adversary system demands that the
attorney have the utmost loyalty to his client."4 Given this conflict, the application of tort immunity statutes to public defenders

135. See supra notes 76-79, 92-93, and 116-121 and accompanying text.
136. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st Cen-

tury, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. winter 1995, at 81, 82.
137. Id
138. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for
the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE LJ. 1835, 1837-41 (1994) (dis-

cussing how arbitrary results in death penalty cases frequently stem from the inadequacy
of counsel); Sue A. Pressley, Texas Prisoner Executed Despite Questions of Guilt; Texans

Seem Unmoved by Controversy in Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at A3 (reporting that
the state of Texas may have executed an innocent man).

139. See discussion of Ramirez v. Harris, 773 P.2d 343, 344 (Nev. 1989), Morgano v.
Smith, 879 P.2d 735, 737 (Nev. 1994), Vick v. Hailer, 512 A.2d 249, 252 (Del. Super. CL
1986), affd in part, 522 A.2d 865 (Del. 1987), Browne v. Robb, 583 A.2d 949, 951-52

(Del. 1990), cert denied, 499 U.S. 952 (1991), and Bradshaw v. Joseph, 666 A.2d 1175
(Vt. 1995), supra Section 11(B)(1).
140. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr Rule 1.7 cmt. (1992)
(stating that "[l]oyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client").
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and court-appointed counsel only serves to embitter indigent clients and to create an irresolvable ethical dilemma for their defense
attorneys.
The sole effort to harmonize this contradiction, the Vermont
Supreme Court's attempt in Bradshaw v. Joseph,41 illustrates the
theoretical infirmity of the qualified-immunity rule." Defending
this dual-role concept, the Bradshaw court explained that the "apparent paradox" of categorizing public defenders as state employees was but "a variant of numerous interbranch conflicts that inhere in our system of separation of powers, including the clear
paradox of having the judicial branch decide constitutional challenges to legislative enactments whereas the Legislature appropriates the funds that sustain the judicial branch."'" This explanation, however, incorrectly assumes that the public defender is part
of the judicial branch. On the contrary, the public defender operates independently from both the legislative and judicial branches,
functioning for all intents and purposes as a private lawyer.'"
Thus, the classification of a public defender as a state employee
cannot be defended as being an inherent conflict in our system of
separation of powers.
2. Attorney Accountability to the Client. The doctrine of
malpractice immunity obliterates another cornerstone of our
adversary system-the idea that attorneys should be held legally
and professionally accountable to their clients-and yields perverse
results. Qualified and absolute immunity greatly increase the risk
that indigent clients will receive sub-standard legal representation
by allowing most, if not all, acts of attorney incompetence to go
unpunished. Under qualified immunity, indigent-defense attorneys
are protected from liability for discretionary acts and omissions
made in the course of executing their official duties. 45 Yet,
because almost every aspect of criminal defense work involves a
decision that could be considered discretionary, a public defender
who provides shoddy representation in a qualified-immunity jurisdiction"4 has no real fear of malpractice. For instance,
141. 666 A.2d 1175, 1178 (Vt. 1995).
142. The Nevada and Delaware courts, which also view indigent-defense attorneys as

state employees or public officials, did not attempt to reconcile this contradiction.
143. Joseph, 666 A.2d at 1178.
144. See supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
145.

See Section II(B)(1) for a complete discussion of qualified immunity.

146. Under Delaware law, an indigent client has a slightly greater degree of protec-
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qualified immunity would fully insulate a public defender who fails
to raise appropriate defenses or to call necessary witnesses on
behalf of his client. In contrast, a privately retained attorney who
commits these errors surely can expect a malpractice suit. As a
result, the qualified-immunity rule allows an indigent defendant to
sue his attorney only for ministerial or clerical mistakes, such as
missing a filing deadline or allowing the statute of limitations to
run.
Absolute immunity permits an even more absurd standard of
legal and professional ethics. The New Mexico and Minnesota
courts suggest that malpractice immunity actually would help indigent defendants. 4 7 This view, however, ignores the obvious fact
that absolute immunity makes the indigent-defense attorney completely unaccountable to the client for all acts of incompetence. A
public defender could miss filing deadlines, fail to suppress illegally
seized evidence, or even forget to appear in court without fear of
being held legally and professionally accountable to the client. The
Dziubak case itself is a good example of this perverse standard. In
Dziubak, an expert witness had misread the toxicology report of
the decedent whom the defendant was accused of killing; the
defendant's lawyer, a public defender, failed to bring this information to the court's attention."4 As a result, the indigent defendant was convicted wrongly and was incarcerated for fifteen
months until exculpatory evidence came to light. Yet, although the
client clearly had suffered as a consequence of the defender's
negligent representation, Dziubak's absolute-immunity rule precluded any suit for malpractice. This standard of unaccountability
demeans the idea of professional responsibility in the attorney-

tion from incompetent representation than in other qualified-immunity jurisdictions because the Delaware tort statute does not provide immunity to an indigent-defense attor-

ney for wanton or willful acts or omissions. See cases cited supra notes 87-94 and accompanying text.
147.
The extension of immunity to public defenders will ensure that the resources
available to the public defender will be used for the defense of the accused,
rather than diminished through the defense of public defenders against civil
suits for malpractice. Immunity will conserve these resources to provide an effective defense to the greatest number of indigent defendants.

Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 777-78; see Coyazo v. State, 897 P.2d 234, 240 ("Indigent defendants as a class are benefited because more attorneys are encouraged and
likely to participate in indigent defense work.")
148. Dziubak, 503 N.W.2d at 773 n.2.
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client relationship and effectively leaves the indigent defendant at
the mercy of his attorney.
B. Malpractice Immunity Disregards the Rights of the Indigent
Criminal Defendant
The second major flaw with malpractice immunity for indigent-defense counsel is its complete disregard for the rights of the
indigent criminal defendant. The immunity courts fail to understand that the right to sue for malpractice is the indigent
defendant's sole guarantee that his appointed attorney will mount
a competent, vigorous defense. It is self-evident that the right to
sue for malpractice is an essential right for all criminal defendants.
While relatively few criminal defendants actually sue their attorneys for malpractice,149 the importance of this right lies not in
necessarily winning damages but in deterring sub-standard representation. The implicit threat of initiating a malpractice suit deters
shoddy representation because the stigma of defending oneself
from malpractice is in itself a huge stain on an attorney's professional reputation.'
To an indigent client, however, the right to sue for malpractice is of even greater importance. Without this right, the indigent
defendant lacks any other viable means of enforcing his right to
competent representation. First, an indigent client obviously cannot
use financial incentives to ensure an adequate defense; unlike a
paying client, he cannot hire and fire counsel at will. Second, given
the Supreme Court's ruling that public defenders do not act "under color of state law" when performing traditional attorney functions, an indigent defendant is effectively foreclosed from bringing
a federal civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to vindicate his
right to counsel.' Third, while the Scott case suggests that bar
149. According to one study, criminal malpractice cases comprise only 3% of all malpractice claims. The areas of law that have the highest incidence of malpractice are
plaintiff's-side personal injury/property damage cases (25%) and real estate cases (23%).
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PROFILE OF LEGAL MALPRACTICE: A STATISTICAL
STUDY OF DETERMINATIVE CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS ASSERTED AGAINST ATrORNEYS 8 (1986) [hereinafter A.B.A. PROFILE].
150. See, e.g., Tom W. Bell, Comment, Limits on the Privity and Assignment of Legal
Malpractice Claims, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533, 1534 (1992) (commenting that "the threat
of being sued for legal malpractice haunts the thoughts of practicing attorneys").
151. See supra note 71-72 and accompanying text; see also David A. Sadoff, Note,
The Public Defender as Private Offender: A Retreat from Evolving Malpractice Liability
Standards for Public Defenders, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 883, 895-96 (1995).
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associations and courts can discipline attorneys for incompetent
representation," an indigent defendant realistically cannot pursue this remedy if he is incarcerated. While it is conceivable that
bar associations and courts in immunity jurisdictions would implement these professional standards, it is more likely that these
bodies would be sympathetic of the indigent-defense attorneys'
burdens and thus be hesitant to discipline them for errors that are
not legally actionable. Finally, the only other remedy available to
indigent defendants, a post-conviction action for ineffective assistance of counsel as set forth in Strickland v. Washington,'153 neither provides for damages nor sanctions the attorney for inadequate representation. Although these suits free an indigent defendant from an improper conviction, they do nothing to vindicate
the right to counsel. More importantly, criminal defense attorneys
have little fear of ineffective-assistance-of-counsel suits because the
Strickland standard is extremely narrow and all but impossible to
satisfy." As a result, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel suits have
little deterrent value. Thus, in light of the absence of other viable
remedies, foreclosing the right to sue for malpractice precludes an
indigent from enforcing his right to adequate representation.
Exaggerating the threat of frivolous malpractice suits, the
Browne and Dziubak courts expressed fears that the no-immunity
rule would encourage dissatisfied clients to sue their appointed
counsel for malpractice, ultimately diverting scarce resources from
public defense and discouraging lawyers from serving as indigent-

152. See Scott v. Niagara Falls, 407 N.Y.S.2d 103, 105 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978).
153. Under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel remedy outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), an aggrieved defendant must prove that his attorney's repre-

sentations fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that the outcome of his
case would have been different but for his attorney's errors. Id. at 688 (finding that "the

defendant must show that the counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness" and that "the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance

was reasonable considering all the circumstances"); Id. at 694 (finding that "the defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
error, the result of the proceeding would have been different").
154. See, eg., Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Effective Assistance: Just a Nominal
Right?, NAT'L LJ., June 11, 1990, at 42 (quoting Stephen B. Bright, director of the Southern Prisoners Defense Committee in Atlanta, as saying that "[the ineffective-assistance-

of-counsel] standard has come down, down, down"). This article also provides a chart
showing how many ineffective-assistance-of-counsel suits were successful in certain federal
appellate courts since 1984. In the Fifth Circuit, for example, relief was granted in only
one of 32 ineffective-assistance-of-counsel

cases. Id.
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defense attorneys." These courts, however, ignore the fact that
the inherent difficulty of bringing a successful criminal malpractice
action as an indigent helps ensure that only meritorious cases will
ever be litigated. Several obstacles prevent indigent defendants
from suing their attorneys for baseless claims. To bring a successful legal malpractice action, a plaintiff generally must show four
elements by a preponderance of the evidence:.. 6 (1) a legal duty
between the attorney and client; (2) an act or omission constituting a breach of that duty; and (3) an injury to the client measurable in damages that is (4) proximately caused by the attorney's
breach."s An indigent malpractice plaintiff will undoubtedly have
great difficulty satisfying this negligence standard. The indigent
plaintiff, who is probably incarcerated, must first convince a lawyer
to take his case on a contingency basis. He also has to retain
another lawyer to serve as an expert witness to testify that his
defense attorney breached the applicable standard of care. In both
cases, attorneys are unlikely to take part in such a case unless it is
truly meritorious; lawyers generally avoid suing other lawyers, let
alone on behalf of an indigent defendant.'
Furthermore, the
overwhelming majority of legal malpractice cases provide minimal
financial incentive.159 In light of these considerations, it is no surprise that none of the immunity courts used empirical data to
substantiate their fear of malpractice suits brought by indigent
defendants.
C. MalpracticeImmunity Has Substantial Costs for the Legal Profession and Society as a Whole
The immunity courts also fail to realize that malpractice im-

155. See supra notes 93, 123-25 and accompanying text.
156. W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 38,

at 239 (5th ed. 1984).
157. Id. § 30, at 164-65.
158. A self-help guide to suing for legal malpractice recognized this fact: "Members of
the legal profession traditionally have been unwilling to sue their fellow lawyers, and
those willing to do so are picky about the cases they take because malpractice cases are
hard to win." DIRECTORY OF LAWYERS WHO SUE LAWYERS 1 (1989). Of course, a

criminal defendant can try to proceed pro se against his former counsel. However, given
the relative complexity of litigating a malpractice case that probably requires expert testimony, a pro se claim is unlikely to succeed.
159. According to one study, 70% of all closed legal malpractice claims paid less than
$1,000 to the claimant. Only 8% of all claims paid more than $25,000. A.B.A. PROFILE,

supra note 149, at 65.
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munity imposes tremendous costs not only on indigent defendants
but also on the legal profession and society as a whole. The immunity courts would like to believe that freeing public defenders
and court-appointed counsel from civil liability yields only positive
results for all parties concerned, especially the conservation of
limited resources in order "to provide an effective defense to the
greatest number of indigent defendants."'" This view, however,
is a mirage. When courts grant malpractice immunity, indigent
defendants are only one of the parties who suffer. Incompetent
representation does not result in increased savings for the courts
and taxpayers. On the contrary, inept lawyering that cuts corners
in the short run inevitably leaves more issues to be raised in habeas corpus and post-conviction proceedings. Indigent clients, although lacking money, are not without their wits and common
sense. If a criminal defendant meets with his attorney only twice
before trial, if necessary witnesses are not called, or if basic elements of the defense are not presented, he is aware that mistakes
have been made. Every time a dissatisfied indigent defendant files
a habeas corpus petition or an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel suit,
taxpayers ultimately bear the financial burden of relitigating these
issues."' The irony is that if competent representation had been
available from the outset, these issues would have been raised and
resolved at the trial level. 162
Malpractice immunity carries another cost that far outweighs
its financial expense: its effect on how the public perceives the
legal profession and how the profession views itself. The very idea
of shielding attorneys from malpractice communicates that in this
situation, lawyers have been absolved of their ethical responsibilities. Cases such as Scott, Coyazo, and Dziubak contend that immunity enables the indigent-defense attorney to conserve her time,
energy, and limited funds in order to best serve the indigent popu-

160. Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 777-78 (1993); see also supra notes 122-25
and accompanying text.
161. See, e.g., Robert J. Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN. L. REv. 869, 915 (1994) (recognizing that "[h]abeas corpus post-conviction proceedings place heavy costs on federal judicial resources").
162.

As a practical matter, both state and federal courts bear the costs of post-convic-

tion proceedings. At first glance, the states may appear to enjoy some savings because
the federal courts assume a portion of these costs, particularly for habeas corpus cases.
One should remember, however, that individual taxpayers-the citizens of the
states-ultimately pay for the administration of the federal courts.
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lation.163 This absolution of professional responsibility, however,
would be shocking in any other setting. For instance, no court
would protect a state-paid doctor from liability for negligent medical care on the grounds that he is underfunded or too busy. Society would never accept this no-liability stance, even if the doctor is
treating the poor.' 64 These "situation ethics" confirm the worst
public cynicism about lawyers and the legal profession.' 6 Moreover, it is important to recognize who is granting immunity to
lawyers in this case. When the public realizes that the courts-the
institutions entrusted to uphold the canons of legal ethics, the
professional responsibility of the bar, and the idea of equality
before the law-are using their power to exempt attorneys from
their ethical responsibilities, the legal profession will inevitably lose
its credibility in the eyes of the public. Thus, contrary to the view
of the immunity courts, there are tremendous monetary and psychic costs associated with the grant of malpractice immunity.
D. Exposing Malpractice Immunity as an Attempt to Protect the
Public Treasury at the Indigent Defendant's Expense
The recent embrace of malpractice immunity for indigentdefense counsel combined with its overall weakness as a legal
doctrine suggest that another reason is driving its increased prominence. This reason, it appears, is the desire to protect the state
treasury from having to pay damages to indigent defendants for
malpractice suits. The time never has been more ripe for a disgruntled indigent client to bring a successful malpractice suit
against his public defender or court-appointed attorney. The "war
on drugs" and the concomitant increase in crime have precipitated
a crisis in indigent defense that has strained the states' ability to

163.
164.

See supra notes 77-78, 109, 122-123 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Becker v. Janinski, 15 N.Y.S. 675, 677 (N.Y. Corn. P1. 1891) ("Whether

the patient be a pauper or a millionaire, whether he be treated gratuitously or for reward, the physician owes him precisely the same measure of duty, and the same degree
of skill and care."); John A. Siliciano, Wealth, Equity, and the Unitary Medical Malpractice Standard, 77 VA. L. REV. 439, 441 (1991) ("To date, medical malpractice law has

refused to recognize formally the economic status of the patient as a factor legitimately
influencing the kind or degree of care the patient receives.").
165. The public already holds the legal profession in disrepute. See, e.g., Colin Covert,
Lawyers Losing Case with Public, STAR TRIB., May 29, 1994, at 1E (observing that "lawyers are relatively popular with people who don't know one" and that "[p]ublic cynicism
about the [legal] profession is rampant-and getting worse").
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provide adequate counsel to all indigent defendants. 166 Moreover,
the taxpaying public has become increasingly unwilling to provide
adequate funds to sustain indigent-defense programs. 67 At a time
when many indigent-defense attorneys are handling hundreds of
cases annually, the inadequate representation of indigent defendants is in danger of becoming the general rule rather than the
exception. Well aware of this harsh reality and expecting no relief
from the legislature, the immunity courts have fashioned their own
response to the indigent-defense crisis. In essence, they have used
malpractice immunity as a sub rosa means of protecting the state
treasury from the very real risk that indigent defendants will successfully sue their public defenders and court-appointed counsel for
malpractice.'68
In evaluating this change in the law, a tragic irony soon becomes apparent: The state courts that have granted immunity have
turned their backs on the Supreme Court's progressive Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. In making the right to counsel a constitutional right, the Gideon Court recognized that our adversary
system is incapable of dispensing justice when an accused individual lacks competent legal representation. In this humane spirit,
Gideon and its progeny were intended to protect the rights of the
indigent criminal defendant-the weakest member in our criminal
justice system-from the powerful hands of the state. Yet, by
transferring the burdens of the criminal justice system onto their
weary shoulders, malpractice immunity effectively reverses these
roles. The doctrine of malpractice immunity now serves as a buffer
to protect the state and its treasury from the indigent defendant.
Sadly, the courts granting immunity have lent their imprimatur to
a judicial device that emphasizes fiscal expediency and convenience
over the protection of a constitutional right. 69

166. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
168. The immunity courts would probably deny that the fear of paying damages for
malpractice is animating the decision to grant immunity. Only one court, the Coyazo
court, has countenanced that "protectling] the public treasury" is a legitimate reason for
extending malpractice immunity. Coyazo v. State, 897 P.2d 234, 240 (N.M. Ct. App.
1995).
169. If a state legislature passes a law granting immunity to indigent-defense attorneys,
one may argue correctly that the courts are obligated to follow this statute. The courts
discussed in this Note, however, have not deferred to the legislature's judgment; rather,

they have seized the initiative and chosen to grant immunity on their own accord.
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IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The inherent unfairness of this change in the law prompts the
question of what, if anything, can be done to address the problems
associated with the doctrine of malpractice immunity. Several commentators have undertaken this task and have offered proposals
for reform.'
All voicing reservations about the use of malpractice immunity as a legal doctrine, these commentators contend that
the indigent defendant should retain in some form the right to sue
for malpractice. However, in recognition of the nature of the indigent-defense attorney's job and the harsh economic realities that
beset most indigent-defense programs, these commentators propose
that this right be modified. One commentator advocates a "twopronged solution" that would require courts to modify the evidentiary threshold for proving ineffective assistance of counsel while
simultaneously extending limited statutory liability to public defenders as state employees. 71' Another has designed a model
statute that requires the indigent client to prove his malpractice
action by a standard of clear and convincing evidence.' Yet another commentator has proposed a "sensible malpractice liability
standard" that would use an ordinary tort negligence standard but
would immunize public defenders from liability when "budgetary
constraints" prevent them from hiring necessary out-of-office experts, specialists, or translators.' 73
Although admirable in their attempt to address a seemingly
intractable problem, these proposals miss the point. While all of
these commentators recognize the manifest unfairness of denying
indigent individuals the "ability to hold their criminal defense
lawyers monetarily accountable for unsatisfactory representation,"' 74 their proposals ultimately leave indigent defendants with
an emasculated, ineffective right to sue for malpractice. The "twopronged solution," which recommends that public defenders re-

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See infra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
See Rutherford, supra note 114, at 1005-10.
See Richards, supra note 114, at 550-56.
See Sadoff, supra note 151, at 921, 930-31.
Rutherford, supra note 114, at 1002; see also Richards, supra note 114, at 550

("Rather, under a rule of public defender malpractice immunity, some people would be

allowed to sue negligent attorneys while others would not."); Sadoff, supra note 151, at
903 ("If indigent criminal defendants were foreclosed from suing their attorneys while
economically advantaged defendants could continue to bring malpractice claims against
private counsel, the system would strike us as unfair.").
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ceive "limited statutory liability" as state employees, is merely a
form of qualified immunity. This proposal ignores the fact that a
public defender simply cannot serve two clients-the defendant
and the state-at the same time.17s Next, the model statute requiring an indigent client to prove his malpractice suit by clear
and convincing evidence violates the basic assumption that an
indigent client should have the same rights and privileges as a
paying client. 76 This proposal fails to appreciate the unique importance that the right to sue for malpractice has to the indigent
defendant. 77 Finally, the "sensible malpractice liability standard"
that immunizes a public defender from liability when budgetary
constraints prevent him from hiring a required outside expert,
specialist, or translator gives legal sanction to the idea that the
poor are not entitled to an effective, thorough defense. Under this
proposed standard, an insane defendant who lacks money would
have no redress against a public defender who did not hire a
psychiatric expert for his defense. Similarly, an indigent defendant
who only speaks Spanish would have no relief against an appointed attorney who did not retain a translator. Not fully appreciating
that the right to sue for malpractice is an essential right that all
criminal defendants must possess in its pure, unadulterated form,
these commentators erroneously accept the premise that malpractice immunity can be used as a legitimate means for coping with
the indigent-defense crisis.
These recommendations ultimately fail because they do not
squarely address the root of the indigent-defense crisis: the inadequate funding of legal representation programs for indigent clients.
Although legal theories that support the use of intrusive judicial
remedies to attack the problem of underfunding exist, none of
these theories are particularly promising in the context of the right
to counsel. For instance, one could argue that the grant of malpractice immunity violates the indigent defendant's constitutional
right to equal protection vis-h-vis the Sixth Amendment 78 and
therefore necessitates an intrusive court-ordered remedy. 79 How175. See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text for further discussion of this contradiction.
176. As with most tort cases, the evidentiary standard for malpractice cases is by
preponderance of the evidence. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.

177. See supra notes 149-54 and accompanying text.
178. Two of the aforementioned commentators have also suggested this argument. See
Pedersen, supra note 114, at 1044-45; Richards, supra note 114, at 547-50.
179. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (considering a judicially imposed
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ever, Supreme Court precedent does not consider wealth to be a
sufficient basis for identifying a suspect class 80 nor does the
Equal Protection Clause require "absolute equality or precisely
equal advantages."'' Unsurprisingly, the sole immunity court to
consider such an equal protection challenge, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals, rejected it." One could also argue that the
judiciary should exercise its "inherent power" to compel adequate
funding for indigent-defense programs. The inherent power doctrine emphasizes that "the judicial system, as one of the branches
of government, must claim and exert certain powers to maintain
the integrity of the judicial branch."'" Unfortunately, the inherent power doctrine generally is invoked to vindicate structural,
separation-of-powers interests rather than individual rights such as
the right to counsel." 4 Furthermore, state courts have been more
hesitant than federal courts to adopt intrusive remedies.8 5

tax to fund a school desegregation remedy).
180. See San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24-29 (1973). See also
Frank I. Michelman, Foreword. On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 27 (1969) (stating that considering wealth as a suspect
classification is "endemically troublesome as a matter of principle").
181. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 24. Moreover, in Ross v. Moffitt, the Court held that a
state's refusal to appoint counsel in the later stages of the appellate process did not
violate the Equal Protection Clause. 417 U.S. 600, 610 (1974). The court set forth the
following standard for deciding equal protection challenges involving indigent defendants
in this situation:

The duty of the State

. .

. is not to duplicate the legal arsenal that may be pri-

vately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort to reverse his
conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity
to present his claims fairly in the context of the State appellate process.
Id. at 616.
182. Coyazo v. State, 897 P.2d 234, 241 (1995).
183. Gabrielle T. Letteau, Note, Crisis in California: Constitutional Challenges to Inadequate Trial Court Funding, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 557, 575 (1995); see also Howard
B. Glaser, Wachtler v. Cuomo: The Limits of Inherent Power, 14 PACE L. REv. 111
(1994); Andrd Doguet, Note, McCain v. Grant Parish Police Jury: Judicial Use of the
Inherent Powers Doctrine to Compel Adequate Judicial Funding, 46 LA. L. REv. 157
(1985).
184. See Letteau, supra note 183, at 575-82. The inherent power doctrine also varies
with the constitutions of individual states. Id.
185. See, e.g., Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts,
104 HARv. L. REv. 1072, 1073-85 (1991) (discussing the judicial reluctance to use intrusive remedies as manifested in the extensive state constitutional litigation over school
finance equity). Applying inherent power doctrine to the right-to-counsel context may also
undermine the basic assumption that indigent-defense attorneys operate independently of
the judiciary.
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Ironically, the no-immunity rule itself provides a structural
check to the problem of inadequate funding of indigent-defense
programs.1" It is axiomatic that large tort judgments tend to
compel proper behavior." 7 Allowing indigent defendants to bring
malpractice suits serves as a way of holding the legislature accountable for its decision to withhold adequate funding for these
programs. While few legislatures would increase funding for indigent defense voluntarily," they may do so if indigent clients are
able to bring successful malpractice suits against their attorneys
with regularity. Moreover, the very idea of having the state pay
damages to indigent defendants is a humiliating scenario that most
legislatures would want to avoid. For these reasons, having the
state pay tort damages to indigent clients accomplishes something
that the doctrine of immunity could never do: prod the legislature
to deal forthrightly with the indigent-defense crisis by appropriating sufficient funds to deal with the increased numbers of indigent
defendants in the criminal justice system.'8 9
CONCLUSION

The writer James Baldwin once observed that "[a]nyone who
has ever struggled with poverty knows how extremely expensive it
is to be poor."" The experience of the nation's indigent criminal defendants, who are already the weakest parties in our criminal justice system, attests to the accuracy of this statement. Having
grown even poorer as malpractice immunity has gained adherents,

186. Of course, the ideal solution is for the legislature to appropriate sufficient funds
for indigent-defense services on its own volition. But given the unpopularity of poor
criminal defendants and the reasons discussed supra Section I(B), it is extremely unlikely
that any legislature would even consider such legislation. See Mounts, supra note 22, at
482 (observing that politicians "at best, ha[ve] little to gain by advocating large expenditure for the defender office, and at worst, much to lose").
187. See, e.g., Macmillan v. Redman Homes, Inc., 818 S.W.2d 87, 95-96 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1991) (finding that "one of tort law's goals--and one of its results-is to deter
conduct and shape behavior").
188. See supra text accompanying note 186.
189. One may argue that having to pay a large amount of damages to an indigent
defendant simply would galvanize the legislature to pass a statute granting malpractice
immunity. While this argument is not without basis, the courts should refrain from taking
the initiative in using malpractice doctrine in this manner. See supra text accompanying
note 169 and notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
190. JAMEs BALDWIN, Fifth Avenue, Uptown, in NOBODY KNOWS MY NAME 56, 62

(1961).
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these citizens have been forced to surrender a truly priceless
right-the constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel.
The poverty of these criminal defendants, however, pales in
comparison to the intellectual and ethical impoverishment of malpractice immunity itself. By merely transferring the burdens of the
indigent-defense crisis, the immunity courts have sanctioned a legal
doctrine that is inconsistent with the core principles that undergird
our adversary system of criminal justice. Tragically, these courts
have disregarded the rights of the indigent defendant and have
failed to account for the tremendous financial and psychic costs
that malpractice immunity inevitably brings. In this myopic effort
to save taxpayer dollars, these courts have effectively extinguished
Gideon's guarantee that the accused shall have the right to competent representation in all criminal trials.

